

1918—



—1945

ALFRED UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Entered as 2nd class matter

Alfred University Reading Room

Alfred

New York

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXV, No. 2

OCTOBER 26, 1945

SOLE CONTROL OF ATOM BOMB FAILS TO BOLSTER U.S. DIPLOMACY

WITH more than two score fighting ships of the Pacific fleet anchored in New York harbor for the celebration of Navy Day on October 27, thousands of New Yorkers have been drawn to the waterfront to see the famous veterans of the victory over Japan. There is a festive air about the usually drab piers along the Hudson as crowds of visitors wait their turn to board the *Enterprise*—the huge carrier that participated in the entire Pacific campaign and was "sunk" no less than six times by the Japanese radio—or inspect the *Missouri*—on whose decks the Japanese surrender was signed. Yet this glorious homecoming of the fleet fails to give one a sense of security; the proud combat record of the great steel armada offers no assurance of the future effectiveness of American sea power. While viewing these giant naval units, one is uneasily aware that they may be mere anachronisms in the new age of atomic weapons and of little avail in protecting the United States from future attacks.

FULBRIGHT PLAN FOR THE ATOM. As Senator J. William Fulbright declared, in an address before the Foreign Policy Association in New York on October 20, the discovery of atomic power may have weakened rather than strengthened the position of the United States in relation to other nations. For once other countries acquire the secrets of atomic warfare, and no scientist doubts that they will succeed in doing so before long, the United States would be particularly vulnerable to a single surprise attack because of its highly concentrated population and industry. By comparison, a nation like the Soviet Union—with its vast spaces and dispersed industrial plant—would be better able to survive such an attack and to strike back. Under these conditions Senator Fulbright urged the United States to adopt a plan for using its present control of atomic power to secure the establishment of a system of interna-

tional inspection, designed to detect and report attempts to manufacture atomic bombs.

Particular urgency attaches to Senator Fulbright's proposal because thus far the United States has made no effort to prevent an armaments race for atomic weapons, against which responsible scientists insist there is no possible protection. The Administration-sponsored bill, introduced in Congress by Senator Edwin C. Johnson and Representative Andrew J. May, is concerned exclusively with the establishment of a Presidential commission to control scientific research and the American manufacture of articles based on the use of atomic energy.

Perhaps one reason the international aspects of the problem have not yet been dealt with is that many Americans are of the opinion that control of the atomic bomb by the United States and Britain gives the Western Allies a marked advantage—although admittedly a temporary one—in negotiating the post-war peace settlement with Russia. This assumption seems belied, however, by the tension that exists between the Soviet Union and the Western powers in nearly every part of Europe—to name only one important area of the world in which the interests of the Big Three come into close contact. The Russians are well aware that the United States would not now use the atomic bomb against any one unless it was attacked first. However, the addition of the atomic bomb to our arsenal has admittedly resulted in giving Moscow a new reason for strengthening its control over eastern Europe.

AUSTRIAN QUESTION REMAINS. In Austria, which has been an area of tension between Russia and the Western powers since last April—when the Moscow radio announced the formation of the Renner cabinet in the Russian-occupied zone—Allied relations remain confused. All four powers occupying Austria seemed to have unified their policies when,

Contents of this BULLETIN may be reprinted with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

on October 20, they announced that the authority of the Renner cabinet would be extended to the country as a whole, subject to the supervision of the Allied Control Council in Vienna. This show of Allied harmony was apparently broken on the following day, however, when Russia declared its desire to establish diplomatic relations with the Renner government, while the United States and Britain insisted that formal recognition should not be extended to Austria until free elections had been held.

DEBATE ON GERMANY CONTINUES. Some signs of inter-Allied disagreement also persist in connection with the difficult problem of Germany. Although all the victors agree that Germany should be demilitarized and denazified, and that democratic political life should be encouraged so that the Reich will no longer be a threat to peace, important differences have arisen among the Allies over the interpretation of these goals.

At present one of the main issues relates to the kind of economy Germany should be permitted to have. According to the Potsdam agreement, the German people are to be allowed to maintain average living standards not exceeding those of other European countries (excluding the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.). The Russians, who are chiefly interested in collecting the largest possible amount of reparations from Germany in order to rebuild their own shattered cities, adhere to a strict interpretation of this economic formula. Moreover, this strong Russian stand in favor of depriving Germany of its heavy industries and economic strength reflects the old fear on the part of the Soviet Union that Britain and the United States may attempt to rebuild Germany as a bulwark against Russia. Among the British, on the other hand, Germany's economic collapse is viewed with great alarm, because of its possible adverse effect on the nations of western Europe, and Britain tends to argue that the German living stand-

ard should be at least as high as that of the rest of the continent.

Under these conditions, the point of view adopted by the United States in connection with the Reich's future economy is of key importance and will probably be a determining factor in allaying or increasing Russia's suspicions of the intentions of the Western Allies toward Germany. The original American position on Germany is known to have been the so-called "Morgenthau Plan," which went even further than the economic scheme subsequently adopted by the Big Three at Potsdam in that it proposed the elimination of all German heavy industry. Doubts were raised, however, as to the attitude of the United States toward Germany's economic revival, when it was revealed early this month that a group of American economic advisers had reported to the Allied Control Commission in Berlin that the Potsdam economic plan was too drastic to permit the maintenance of a subsistence standard of living in Germany.

During the past two weeks American military government officials have labelled this report unofficial, and Secretary of State Byrnes has released the text of the original directive to General Eisenhower regarding the government of Germany, which specifically opposed the rehabilitation of the German economy. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the United States has succeeded in reducing suspicions which have complicated Allied collaboration in Germany. There is, of course, still room for argument as to the relative importance of reparations and the maintenance of a subsistence standard of living for Germany—which is obviously essential if the Allies are to fulfil their plan for reconstructing democratic life among the Germans. But these arguments will be susceptible to reasonable compromises if the issues do not become befogged by charges and countercharges among the Allies as to their motives in Germany.

WINIFRED, N. HADSEL

LABOR EXPRESSES SPIRIT OF RESURGENT BRITAIN

LONDON, OCTOBER 19.—The intrinsic quality of England in this unseasonably sunny autumn of 1945 is serenity. People in the streets of London and Edinburgh, of Glasgow and Manchester, are visibly weary but, because in the most gruelling moments of their six-year ordeal they never pretended that war was anything but a messy business and studiously avoided heroics, they are to an extraordinary degree free from both the stupor and the self-intoxication induced in other peoples by the cessation of hostilities. They can again, without any effort at acting a part, pass from grisly memories of fire-fighting and rescue of air-raid victims to contemplation of Saxon or Norman architecture, or discussion of pre-Raphaelite painting.

This freedom from pose is so ingrained that one

realizes with a start why Labor's victory should have been deduced from the very temper of the English people. The dramatic, exhibitionist aspects of men like Churchill and Montgomery, stimulating as they might have been in time of war, are alien and, in fact, suspect to most Englishmen. It is the Attlees and the Bevins, who seem homespun and intrinsically honest, to whom the people spontaneously turn with confidence—not because they are Labor but because they represent qualities that are familiar and respected.

The English have emerged from the war with few tangible assets. Their factories and shops are empty of peacetime goods. Their thrice-mended but miraculously neat clothes are shabby, and they themselves are stripped of many illusions we still indulge in.

But they have acquired the asset—beyond value in our turbulent world—of serenity: a serenity that is a blend of humility and dignity. They have learned, through bitter experience, the limitations of their resources of food, raw materials, industrial equipment, finances and manpower. They have had to stretch these limited resources to the breaking-point, making use of every patch of land to raise urgently needed food, substituting ingenuity for possession of essential materials, making use of the talents and efforts of every man, woman and child in the British Isles. They know that their future is bleak, and that to survive they will have to call on their wits and on their willingness to sacrifice individual comfort for the nation's good.

WAR FORGED NEW UNITY. But their humility is tinged with pride. They are proud that, as a nation, they passed unfalteringly all the tests of war, that every one proved equal to the ordeal—the King and the charwoman, the soldier and the scientist, the housewife and the schoolboy. They feel proud of each other in a way that makes this already homogeneous people more close-knit than ever. They are certain that, having weathered the war together, they can weather the peace. Come what may, they trust each other; and this sentiment, in a period when practically every nation is riven by internal conflicts of one kind or another, is not only an incalculable source of national strength, but also gives England's return to peace the character of a remarkable national resurgence. Most remarkable of all, it is a resurgence directed not at territorial or economic expansion but at restoration of human values.

The war has aroused the conscience of the English people. They are aroused not only about the need to improve the living conditions of their fellow citizens by whatever measures may prove necessary. They are also aroused about the sufferings they perforce inflicted on their enemies in the process of winning the war. Far from expressing feelings of revenge toward Germany and Japan, they deprecate the tendency to punish the rank and file in the Axis countries for the misdeeds of their military leaders and show a striking spirit of tolerance and pity. This lack of vindictiveness, too, played a role in the victory of Labor. Many Englishmen resented, toward the end, the blood-and-thunder statements of Churchill and the vengeful propaganda of Brendan Bracken. In Attlee and Bevin they saw the qualities of moderation and every-day morality too long obscured by war. As one Midlands banker put it: "The English

were in a condition when they might have turned to religion. Instead they turned to Labor."

A FORCE FOR THE FUTURE. In spite of the havoc of bombing and all the strains and privations of war England, as in the days of Blake, is still "a green and pleasant land" in which men and women are busy building "a new Jerusalem." The war has not destroyed all the things that used to trouble other peoples about the English before 1939. There are still signs of social snobbery, and one can find plenty of evidence to support past criticism of England as a nation of shopkeepers, who must shop abroad for essential imports and pay for them with exports; and devotees of the Empire, where Britain seeks economic and strategic safeguards of its security, potentially threatened on one side by Russia and on the other by the United States.

But out of the rubble of material destruction emerge the lineaments of another England, the England that believes in the right of men to achieve and maintain freedom in a society of their own choosing, whose ideals have nourished free men everywhere, and in diverse times and far-flung places have inspired the fight for liberty of American colonists and Arab tribes, of Mazzini and Nehru. This England, materially impoverished but spiritually enriched, may in defiance of its opponents' direst predictions leave a more profound imprint on the second half of our century than either Russia or the United States.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1943-44, edited by Francis E. McMurtrie. New York, Macmillan, 1945. \$19.00

Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1943-44, compiled and edited by Leonard Bridgman. New York, Macmillan, 1945. \$19.00

Despite war's disruptions, these marvelously detailed records of naval and air developments appear regularly, to serve as the source of accurate information not readily obtainable elsewhere.

Foreign Policy Begins at Home, by James P. Warburg. New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1944. \$2.50

The author believes that economy may be "planned" by the state in the interests of society, but not "managed" by the state. His book shows the inseparability of domestic and foreign policy.


Cartels, by Wendell Berge. Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1944. \$3.25

The chief of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice presents in this book the case against international cartels. The general problem of monopoly is surveyed and illustrated by the operation of patent cartels and cartels in such fields as medicine, optical instruments, vitamins and others.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN. Vol. XXV, No. 2, OCTOBER 26, 1945. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, *President*; DOROTHY F. LEET, *Secretary*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year.
Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.

Washington News Letter



SENATE TILTS WITH TRUMAN ON ARGENTINE POLICY

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's growing influence in the fashioning of foreign policy confronts President Truman with a difficult administrative problem. The United States cannot take a strong position in world affairs if policies enunciated by the State Department are subsequently weakened by displays of formal Senatorial disapproval. The problem has become increasingly grave since the Committee's intervention in our dealings with Argentina.

The differences between the State Department and Senate over Argentina originated on October 1, when Acting Secretary of State Acheson proposed to the Brazilian government and the Pan American Union that the Inter-American Conference, scheduled to meet in Rio de Janeiro on October 20, be postponed. Acheson took the step because the Administration did not want to be associated with Argentina in a multilateral security treaty for the American Republics. On October 2 Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, expressed his objection to Acheson's unilateral action.

To drive home its point, the Committee complained on October 8 to Secretary Byrnes, when he reported to its members on the London Council of Foreign Ministers, and tried in vain to obtain a statement from him recognizing its right to be consulted on major decisions of policy. On October 10 the Committee ostentatiously deferred consideration of Truman's nomination of Spruille Braden as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American affairs. Braden is regarded as the principal author of the United States' current policy of sternness toward Argentina. But Braden was finally approved by the Senate on October 22. The Senators apparently considered their intrusion into an area usually left to the President and his advisers justified as a result of the appointment last spring of two of them to the United States delegation to the Inter-American Conference at Mexico City. At that conference, Senators Connally and Warren R. Austin played an important part in the negotiations for the Act of Chapultepec, which itself stressed the principle of inter-American consultation that the Senators thought Acheson ignored in his move to postpone the Rio meeting.

TURN-ABOUT IN BUENOS AIRES. Since the attitude of the Foreign Relations Committee stemmed from a desire for greater influence in policy-making, the Committee has not changed its view respecting United States policy toward Argentina as a result

of the turbulent events of the past two weeks in Buenos Aires. The long-smoldering opposition to the government flared up on October 9, when military elements of uncertain political loyalties forced Vice President Juan Perón to resign. Attempts were subsequently made to find an interim government satisfactory both to the democratic groups, who wanted power handed over to the Supreme Court preparatory to elections, and to the military, who insisted on the retention of President Edelmiro Farrell. As negotiations faltered, Colonel Péron came out of custody, rallied his support among the poorer working classes in Buenos Aires and the provinces and, with the aid of the Federal Police, forced the appointment on October 17 of a cabinet completely identified with his program of attaining the Presidency by fair or foul means.

Confronted with the spectacle of a strong-arm government more securely entrenched in Argentina than ever, Washington still gives no evidence of developing a different policy toward that country. Certain elements in the State Department, which consistently have opposed a vigorous policy toward Argentina, express fear that other American governments will look on the policy as interventionist and therefore potentially a menace to themselves. The Administration no longer expects to find outside the Western Hemisphere supporters for stern dealing with Argentina. Britain is determined not to jeopardize its trading position in that country.

UNITED FRONT DESIRABLE. By dividing control of foreign relations between the Executive and Legislative branches, the Constitution promotes rivalry between Senate and President in this area. The Executive branch in turn invites rivalry from the Senate when its various departments fail to agree on policy, as the State Department and the Army, in the person of General MacArthur, obviously disagreed at one time over Japanese affairs. The position of the United States in world affairs would be greatly strengthened if the existing rivalry between the President and the Senate could be lessened by the establishment of a permanent Executive-Legislative council on foreign affairs. By reaching fundamental agreement in advance of action, such a committee could prevent the embarrassing criticism of Executive conduct on the part of the Foreign Relations Committee which now tends to weaken the effect at home, and especially abroad, of United States pronouncements on policy.

BLAIR BOLLES